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Abstract. Encryption has increasingly been used in all applications for
various purposes, but it also brings big challenges to network security.
In this paper, we take first steps towards addressing some of these chal-
lenges by introducing a novel system to identify key exchange protocols,
which are usually required if encryption keys are not pre-shared. We ob-
served that key exchange protocols yield certain patterns of high-entropy
data blocks, e.g. as found in key material. We propose a multi-resolution
approach of accurately detecting high-entropy data blocks and a method
of generating scalable fingerprints for cryptographic protocols. We pro-
vide experimental evidence that our approach has great potential for
identifying cryptographic protocols by their unique key exchanges, and
furthermore for detecting malware traffic that includes customized key
exchange protocols.
1 Introduction
In the network security field, the use of encryption for malicious purposes brings
new challenges to network security defense. For example, encryption has pre-
vented botnet traffic from being inspected and detected by defense systems based
on deep-packet inspection (DPI), which used to be very effective up to that
point. For symmetric encryption and decryption, a secret key k shared among
two communicating parties is required, either pre-shared or negotiated on the fly
using cryptographic key-exchange protocols. Most common cryptographic pro-
tocols [4, 12, 13] using symmetric encryption to secure the channel use a key
exchange protocol, such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [22].
Depending on the protocol design, key material is distributed differently
along the traffic stream. As key material has high entropy compared to nor-
mal traffic, the traffic for the key exchange exhibits detectable characteristics,
namely the uniqueness of the distribution of key material allowing for proper
discriminating characteristics, as shown in Figure 1. Using an entropy metric,
it may not be hard to test the hypothesis whether a byte string is “random,”
if that byte string is sufficiently long. The problem becomes harder if the given
string is relatively short, i.e. undersampled, or if the goal is to identify which
part of the string contains random bytes, in particular, deciding the boundaries
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Fig. 1: Visualization of Entropy Distribution: dark portions are high-entropy
blocks.
of those random bytes (also known as blocks of interest). It is therefore challeng-
ing to characterize a stream by the distribution of embedded random bytes, or
so-called high-entropy blocks.
To avoid being treated as an anomaly, malware might try to use standard
cryptographic protocols (e.g. SSL/TLS) for secure communication, effectively
preventing DPI. However, standard protocols such as SSL can potentially be
subject to a man-in-the-middle attack. However, malware in general tends to
avoid using standard protocols and instead employs a customized variant. Only
10% of malware utilize TLS as a form of encryption, according to a recent study
[1]. To ensure fresh key material, a new key exchange is desirable for every new
command-and-control (C&C) session of the malware [6, 26].
Our work offers a systematic way to characterize network traffic through
key exchange behaviors and generate scalable fingerprints based on detected
high-entropy blocks. The system mainly consists of two parts: the high-entropy
block detection and the fingerprint generation. First, we aim to identify high-
entropy blocks from a traffic stream using sample entropy via a sliding window.
Second, with all high-entropy blocks identified, entropy-based fingerprints for
network flows will be generated by the distribution of high-entropy blocks. Our
contribution also includes:
– A new method of identifying cryptographic protocols, raising the bar for
malicious activities that abuse customizing cryptographic protocols to evade
inspection.
– A voting mechanism that efficiently boosts the accuracy of entropy estima-
tion when undersampled using a multi-resolution analysis.
– A statistical approach to estimate the range of high-entropy data blocks and
build scalable entropy-based fingerprints for key exchange protocols in the
form of regular expressions.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first attempt to fingerprint key
exchange protocols by the distribution of key material and apply such a technique
to malware detection. By design our approach can be implemented and deployed
as a standalone system. However, it is not the intention to replace any existing
detection techniques, but rather to complement them. This system can be built
with existing systems as a plug-in component, in particular those relying on a
certain degree of payload analysis, e.g. [30]. Moreover, a component of our system
can be a useful tool for the security community, e.g. for identifying high-entropy
portions of a given data block, such as detection of packed malware binaries.
Related Work Olivain et al. [20] proposed to use cumulative entropy of net-
work flows for detection of specific attacking behaviors targeted at known cryp-
tographic protocols, i.e. SSL. Instead of an aggregation, our work aims to fin-
gerprint the entropy distribution along the examined traffic. Our approach is
still applicable for their purpose in a more precise way. Meanwhile, we adopt
the technique they propose, N-truncated entropy, for entropy estimation, which
is also used by Dorfinger et al. [7] for classifying encrypted and unencrypted
traffic. There is prior work [28] that shows how entropy tests can be used to de-
tect encrypted or compressed packets from network streams. Again, we provide
a more reliable mechanism to detect high-entropy areas as one of our essential
contributions.
Our work shares an interest from the field of protocol identification. Most of
the work in that field is mainly learning-based, relying on network-observable
features [17,29]. For example, Wright et al. [29] proposed to identify the crypto-
graphic protocol of individual encrypted TCP connections using post-encryption
observable features, such as timing, size, direction etc. To some extent, our ap-
proach can also be also applied for this purpose. However, there are known
obfuscation techniques which could be used to evade this, such as obfsproxy [5]
and FTE [9]. As discussed in [27], obfuscation can be detected with entropy-
based tests over the packet payloads. Our approach does the same by extracting
entropy-based fingerprints.
Zhang et al. [32] proposed to detect encrypted traffic by looking for N sequen-
tial high-entropy packets of all first M packets of one network flow adopting the
cumulative entropy technique. In 2015, Zhang et al. [31] improved their previous
work by detecting of high-entropy flows as an additional measure to score a host
being a bot for BotHunter [14]. Applicable to the same problem, our approach
is different from theirs by fingerprinting malware with customized cryptographic
protocols, such as Nugache, as will be shown. Unlike their work, our work does
not rely on another system for detection.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We begin with background on
entropy and its estimators. In section 3, we discuss our methodology in detail,
including how to identify high-entropy blocks, a voting mechanism as well as
a filtering method for false positives reduction, etc. Following that, section 4
presents evaluation and analysis of our approach with three different dataset.
Finally, we conclude this study by discussing limitations and directions of future
work.
2 Background
2.1 Entropy
Introduced by Shannon [25], entropy is used as a measurement of the amount
of information that is missing before reception. In the context of cryptography,
it is used as a measure of randomness (or uncertainty), equating higher entropy
with higher randomness. Let X be a discrete random variable under an arbi-
trary distribution P on a countable alphabet Σ = {x1, ..., xm}. The definition
of Shannon entropy can be generally expressed by the equation (1),
H(X) = −
m∑
i=1
p(xi) log2 p(xi) (1)
The entropy H(X) yields a maximum value when all p(xi) are equal to
1
m ,
i.e. uniformly distributed. In cryptography, as a fundamental requirement of
security, key material should have high entropy in order to be hard to predict.
2.2 Entropy Estimator
Entropy can be easily obtained by the equation (1) if given a random variable
whose probability distribution is known. However, in practice, P may remain
unknown for most scenarios. Frequently, p(xi) could be still estimated by the
relative frequencies of the outcome xi from a large number of trials. The proba-
bility of xi is thereby pˆ(xi) =
ni
N , where ni is the number of times xi occurs and
N is the total number of trials or samples. Hereby, the sample entropy, a.k.a.
maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) [2], can be estimated as in the equation
below.
HˆMLEN (X) ≡ −
m∑
i=1
pˆ(xi) log2 pˆ(xi) (2)
Even though MLE is an unbiased estimator of H(X) when N tends to in-
finity where pˆ(xi) approximates p(xi) and Hˆ
MLE
N (X) approximates real H(X).
When N is not sufficiently large, namely undersampled, HˆMLEN (X) highly bias,
in particular, N < m or N ∼ m. There is no universal rate at which the error
of MLE compared to H(X) would be close to zero [2]. There are attempts that
aim to subtract the bias directly, such as the Miller-Madow corrector [18], the
Jackknife corrector [11] and the Paninski corrector [21]. However, the bias is still
significantly high when N < m or N ∼ m. Moreover, it has been proven difficult
to find an unbiased estimator [21, 24]. Unfortunately, the Paninski corrector is
unbiased but if and only if P has a uniform distribution, which can not be guar-
anteed. Furthermore, according to this study [20], HˆMLEN (X) ∼ H(X) is valid if
and only if N  m, which typically means N is of the order of roughly at least 10
times as large as m. In another word, if Σ0 = {0x00, ..., 0xff} (i.e. m=|Σ0|=256),
it would require around 2,000 samples to possibly obtain a reasonable estimated
entropy. That makes it impractical for the purpose of profiling network traffic as
key material usually is at most hundreds of bytes (256 bytes = 2048 bits). For
example, in a typical TLS handshake, a client random number only contains 28
bytes.
2.3 N-truncated entropy HN(X)
Similar to Olivain et al. [20], an accurate entropy value is not of our main focus,
but rather the probability of a string being generated from a uniform distri-
bution. The N-truncated entropy HN (X) proposed by Olivain et al. meets our
needs, which is the average of the sample entropy HˆMLEN (X) over all strings of
length of N drawn at random from the distribution P, as defined below.
HN (X) =
∑
Σini=N
[(
N
n0, ..., nm−1
)m−1∏
i=0
pnii
(
−
m−1∑
i=0
ni
N
log2
ni
N
)]
(3)
By construction, HˆMLEN (X) is an unbiased estimator of HN (X) for an arbi-
trary distribution P. More importantly, HˆMLEN (X) gives a statistical indication
that how close the distribution P is to being uniform by comparing to HˆMLEN (W )
given that W be a random variable under a uniform distribution U . In section
3.2, we describe how to obtain both values. Alternatively, if a string s of length
N with each sample drawn from P, we use HˆMLEN (s) instead of HˆMLEN (X). To
differentiate this, w is used instead if uniform distribution, U . HN (X) has an
upper bound of log2 min{m,N} as it reaches its maximum value if all pˆxi are
equal, either pˆxi =
1
N if N < m or pˆxi =
1
m otherwise. In either case, uncertainty
reaches its maximum.
3 Methodology
In this section, we discuss in detail the techniques we used and developed, ac-
companied by experimental evidence.
3.1 Sliding Window
To obtain entropy information of different portions within the traffic stream,
a sliding window moves over the traffic with a step of one byte while sample
entropy will be measured for each chunk of bytes in that window. Bytes in each
window form a block.
The window size determines sample size, which directly impacts the accuracy
of sample entropy. If the sample size is too small, the sample entropy might
not be accurate enough to be meaningful. Equation (4) roughly estimates the
probability of a N-byte string appearing to be “random”, i.e. each char in the
alphabet only occurs once in the string. Fix Σ to be Σ0 and then let m=256.
Let N=16 be a 16-byte sliding window. Pr[X=e]=0.6197. That is, there is a
40% probability that an arbitrary string appears random, i.e. a forty percent
chance of a false positive. However, if N=32, Pr[X=e]=0.082. This confirms the
discussion in Paninski et al. [21] that one should never use less than 16 bytes for
entropy estimation when Σ0 is used.
Pr[X = e] = 1 · m− 1
m
· ... · m−N + 1
m
=
N−1∏
i=0
m− i
m
(4)
If the sliding window grows to be too large, it is likely to mix high-entropy areas
with low-entropy areas, confusing the difference between them. As shown in
Figure 2, when the window size is small, e.g. 16-byte, the curve is fuzzy and has
too many valleys (low-entropy) and peaks (high-entropy), while as the window
size goes larger, e.g. 1024 or 2048-byte, the curve becomes flatter and valleys or
peaks are not distinctive anymore.
Fig. 2: Entropy plot of a TLS sample traffic using different sliding window sizes,
from bottom to top (-byte): 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024 to 2048.
A smaller window is more likely to mistakenly identify a non-random data
area to be “random” (false positive), while a larger window possibly fails to
identify real high-entropy area (false negative). The choice of window size will
heavily depend on the minimum length of key materials of interest. In case of
TLS, we choose a 32-byte sliding window as it is good for the minimum length of
interests, i.e. 28-byte client random number. In summary, as the window slides
over the data with a one-byte step, each block is labeled as either high-entropy
or low-entropy. A list of consecutive either high-entropy blocks or low-entropy
blocks then forms a unit, more precisely a high-entropy unit or a low-entropy
unit respectively.
3.2 Baseline HN(U)
To identify a high-entropy block, we follow the idea used by [20], i.e. the Monte-
Carlo method, as it provides a level of confidence of a string being random. We
first repeatedly generate strings of length of N with each byte sampled from a
random source, e.g. /dev/urandom on MacOS X. Then, we calculate the mean
µ and standard deviation σ of sample entropy using all samples. Here, µ and σ
summarize the distribution of the sample entropy of random strings of length
N . By a specific number t of standard deviations, we can obtain the proportion
of sample strings falling within the range of µ± t× σ. This proportion provides
us with a confidence of a string being random if it falls within the given range.
As exceeding the upper bound does not affect the randomness of the string, we
ignore the upper bound and use the lower bound as a cutoff for a string being
random, denoted by θ, with a confidence by the proportion ρ:
θ = µ
(
HˆMLEN (w)
)− t×σ(HˆMLEN (w)) ρ = number of samples above θnumber of samples (5)
Consequently, any strings falling below the threshold are considered not random,
i.e. low-entropy blocks. Similarly, any strings falling above the threshold will be
considered random, i.e. high-entropy. Table 1 shows thresholds (θ) for w using
different window sizes (N) above a minimum level of confidence 99.0%.
N µ σ t θ ρ
16 3.94199 0.08290 2.8 3.7098 99.2%
32 4.88171 0.08134 2.7 4.6620 99.3%
64 5.76562 0.07664 2.6 5.5663 99.2%
128 6.55003 0.06733 2.5 6.3817 99.2%
256 7.17518 0.05240 2.5 7.0441 99.2%
512 7.59073 0.03364 2.4 7.5099 99.0%
1024 7.80894 0.01726 2.5 7.7658 99.1%
2048 7.90804 0.00814 2.5 7.8877 99.2%
Table 1: HˆMLEN (w) under Various Configurations
The confidence measures the confidence of a string not being random when
falling out of the range, rather than a confidence of a string being random when
falling within the range. For example, let N be 64 and Σ=Σ0, then µ=5.7656,
σ=0.0766. With 99.4% of samples above θ=µ-3σ=5.53569 (i.e. t = 3), we would
have at least 99.4% confidence that a string s with HˆMLEN (s)=5.5120 is not close
to random, i.e. not a high-entropy block. Here, t is our control variable. We can
choose a smaller t to tighten the range with a higher confidence or a larger t to
loosen the range, but with a lower confidence. In our study, we choose t tightly to
obtain a relatively high confidence, at least 99.0%. With the threshold, we could
then transform sample entropy score to either one or zero. The plot turns to be
to a square wave where one indicates high-entropy and zero for low-entropy as
shown in figure 3. The shadow in the upper plot shows the cutoff.
3.3 The choice of Σ
Due to statistical limitations, some data blocks may mistakenly be labeled as
high-entropy blocks, i.e. a false positive, which will mislead the fingerprint and
therefore must be avoided or minimized. In order to achieve this, we devised a
voting mechanism using multi-resolution analysis, utilizing the choice of alphabet
Σ. As will be shown, this mechanism dramatically reduces the rate of false
positives.
Thus far we based our discussion on the choice of Σ to be Σ0 (m=256)
with each char being a byte. In cryptography, however, the randomness of key
Fig. 3: Normalization: high-entropy blocks
material is defined at a more restrictive level, i.e. at a bit level, and thereby
Σ={0, 1} (m=2). Let’s consider one experiment of tossing one coin that has two
outcomes, and another experiment of tossing eight independent coins with two
outcomes for each. According to basic probability theory, if each coin is uniformly
drawn from Σ={0, 1}, the outcome of eight coins (Σ0) will still follow a uniform
distribution. In our estimation of HˆMLEN (w), we do generate each random byte
by randomly sampling eight times over {0, 1} for all our sample strings. That
being said, given that each bit is independently sampled uniformly from {0, 1},
we could choose a random variable of different number of τ bits (i.e. coins) and
such a random variable will be guaranteed to have a uniform distribution.
As an extension to our previous computation of HˆMLEN (w), we outline the
thresholds and their confidence levels for different τ while fixing N to 32. We use
the term τ -bit measure, e.g. 2-bit measure. Previously, N could be interpreted
as either the window size and the sample size. In the case of τ -bit measure, the
sample size changes, i.e. 8τ N (τ ≤ 8). For convenience, we abuse the notation N,
using it as the window size in the rest of this paper. The use of τ -bit measure
does not change the fundamentals of N-truncated entropy as it simply uses a
larger sample size and a different alphabet.
τ m µ σ t θ ρ
1 2 0.9971 0.00399 4.18 0.9804 99.28%
2 4 1.9829 0.01387 3.59 1.9331 99.20%
4 16 3.8196 0.06715 3.02 3.6168 99.31%
8 256 4.8817 0.08135 3.0 4.6356 99.35%
Table 2: τ -bit measure HˆMLE32 (w)
Statistical methods such as sample entropy generally ignore potential struc-
tures or patterns occurring in the data. Therefore, a string with a high sample
entropy score is not guaranteed to be random. For example, given a hexadeci-
mal string s be “55 55 bb bb”, i.e. 0101 0101 0101 0101 1010 1010 1010 1010
in binary, we have pˆ0 = pˆ1 =
1
2 if 1-bit measure (τ=1) used, i.e. Σ={0, 1}, and
then HˆMLEN (s) = 1. Consequently, s will be labeled as high-entropy bytes in
spite they are not at all. Taking another example from real world, a hexadecimal
string from a TLS session: 16 03 01 0c 13 0b 00 0c 0f 00 0d 0e 10 04 7a 30 82,
which is a block of control information3 from the TLS handshake traffic. The
two bytes 03 01 indicate the TLS version, i.e. TLS 1.0, 0c 13 for the length,0b
for the protocol type, and another 3 bytes of length 00 0c 0f. This block may
not also appear “random“ if an 8-bit measure is used. Such cases are prone to
false positives and mislead the process.
Fig. 4: A traffic sample from a TLS 1.2 session with a 1024-bit RSA public key.
However, the idea is that if a string is random, no matter which τ -bit measure
is being used, its sample entropy HˆMLEN (s) should be always close to HˆN (U).
Thus, we propose to use a voting mechanism instead of using a sole τ -measure.
The voting rule is if any of chosen τ -bit measure rejects the randomness of that
block, the block will be labeled as non-random. It is a simple AND operation
among the outcome of all measures. Figure 4 shows the effectiveness of combining
three τ -measures, where the resulting signature by voting precisely outlines all
high-entropy blocks in the TLS session. The last plot line, X-signature, is based
on the voting over the three 1-bit, 4-bit and 8-bit measures.
3.4 Filtering Threshold
Our voting mechanism effectively reduces false positives. However, in some sce-
narios, this approach may still not be sufficient to eliminate all false positives.
3 Control information is commonly known to have low entropy.
There is still a chance that all τ -bit measures falsely identify an ordinary block
to be high-entropy because of accidentally some small actual randomness within
the data. If there supposedly are no high-entropy data blocks, the length of a
data block with randomness should be less than the minimum length of interest
and the size of detected high-entropy units would appear to be relatively small
compared to that, if there actually exists a high-entropy data block of interest.
A filtering threshold denoted as ξ is possibly chosen to eliminate those small
high-entropy units. Our empirical study suggests ξ = 9 to be a good choice
when a 32-byte sliding window size chosen for detecting a minimum 20-byte
high-entropy key material blocks. That means if there are only 9 consecutive
high-entropy blocks detected between two low-entropy units, then a false pos-
itive is identified and filtered out in that case. Here, the “filter out” means
labeling these blocks to be low-entropy instead of high-entropy.
3.5 Calibration
Beyond identifying high-entropy blocks, it is also essential to describe the length
of each unit in order to fingerprint the shape of the square wave as shown in 4.
Due to its statistical inheritance and the way of measuring, the length of each
unit (i.e. the number of detected consecutive high-entropy or low-entropy blocks)
may vary because when the sliding window is partially over the target random
bytes, it may still continue to yield high sample entropy blocks until the win-
dow moves sufficiently away from the target. For example, a TLS traffic stream
contains a client random number as a chunk of 28 bytes. It is not difficult to
anticipate that there will not be only exactly one high-entropy block detected in
this case. The total number of high-entropy blocks detected around that chunk
of data will not be fixed as well from case to case. However, our intention is
not to determine an absolute value for each unit among all cases, but rather a
certain reasonable range. Hereby, we resort to Monte-Carlo methods to empir-
ically estimate the range. For example, to estimate the length of high-entropy
unit around client random bytes, we sampled 100,000 client hello messages from
TLS sessions.
The result shown in figure 5 indicates most of the length for the 28-byte client
random string followed by the list of cipher suites fall within a range between six
high-entropy blocks and twenty-four blocks. If a 32-byte TLS session ID (also
random bytes) is present along with the client random bytes, adding up to 60
bytes, we obtain a range of [38, 52] as shown in figure 5. A more conservative
range would be [20, 52].
3.6 Fingerprinting
Fingerprinting is a process to profile a key exchange protocol by its distribu-
tion of high-entropy blocks along traffic streams generated by such a protocol. A
entropy-based fingerprint is a series of interleaving high-entropy units and low-
entropy units with the length of each unit specified as a range. The reason that
high-entropy blocks have to interleave with low-entropy ones is that otherwise
Fig. 5: Distribution of length of detected high-entropy blocks (1) Left: over the
TLS 28-byte client random string (2) Right: over the TLS 28-byte client random
string and 32-byte session ID.
two adjacent high-entropy or low-entropy blocks would be merged into one. Let
(s, l, r) represent one unit where s ∈ {1, 0}, l, r ∈ Z+, where s be the sign indi-
cating a high-entropy unit or low-entropy, l be the minimum length and r be the
maximum length. An entropy-based fingerprint then is the concatenation of an
ordered list of (s, l, r) with s alternating among one and zero. Alternatively, it
can be concisely expressed as below, where si ∈ {1, 0}, li, ri ∈ Z+. The benefit of
such a representation is that this form aligns with standard regular expression
and the matching process can be done very efficiently. The regular expression
form will provide a flexible way of expressing the fingerprint, for instance, op-
tional units, as will be shown in the experiment section.
nn
i=1
si{li, ri}, si 6= si+1
The fingerprinting is straightforward in three steps: (1) identify high-entropy
and low-entropy areas (units) of the anticipated traffic from a cryptographic
protocol; (2) follow the technique described in section 3.5 and estimate the range
for each area; (3) formalize the units in a regular expression. Taking TLS using
a cipher-suite of DHE-RSA-* as an example, the fingerprint is as below:
1{8, 54}0{20, 1024}1{8, 54}0{30, 800}1{80, 260}....
During the detection phase, we have these steps: (1) scan the traffic stream
by sliding a window over it and estimating sample entropy for each window
using different τ -bit measures; (2) normalize each block by its entropy score to
either one or zero using the pre-calculated threshold θ; (3) perform the voting
(i.e. AND) of outcomes from each measures; (4) filter out the noises using filter
threshold; (5) use regular expression to match the predefined fingerprint against
the output (i.e. a string consisting of zeros and ones).
In our demonstration, we emphasize DHE-RSA-* cipher-suite for TLS proto-
col as our approach aims to profile that a particular key exchange protocol and
TLS is capable of using different key exchange protocols. SSL has evolved over
time into the standard TLS protocol, which supports a long list of cipher suites
with different key exchange protocols. To demonstrate, we choose to profile one
set of key exchange protocol cipher suites, i.e. DHE-RSA-*, (see 3). By contrast,
as an application of our system, most botnet C&C protocols are much simpler as
most of them are designed for the sole purpose of performing a limited number
of tasks.
4 Evaluation
SSL/TLS is a well-known cryptographic protocol with fair complexity. The suc-
cessful characterization of the TLS protocol provides the full ability to charac-
terize other and simpler botnet C&C protocols. For evaluation, we first use TLS
as our primary target and later extend it to the Nugache botnet. All streams
are bidirectional and packets of a stream are correctly ordered with all TCP/IP
headers removed. The tshark [3] was used as a primary tool to process network
traces in pcap [15].
4.1 Datasets
We obtained a data set of TLS network traffic from the ZMap project [8]. Ini-
tially, we extracted 16,240 TCP streams on standard port 443 from 800MB
of raw traffic data and further reduced to 5,794 completed and validated TLS
streams4. Then, we extracted from those 5,794 streams the 1,378 streams that
used one of the DHE-RSA-∗ ciphersuites in Table 3. We split 1,378 instances into
two sets: the d00200 set of 218 instances for parameter selection and signature
refinement and the test set d00300 of 1,160 instances for the testing of the final
signature, denoted as the d00015 set. We also extracted 1,204 TLS instances
with other ciphersuites. We extracted 337 Nugache traffic streams from a set
of raw Nugache traffic and divided instances into two groups: 162 instances of
training set and 175 instances of testing set. Similar to TLS, we use the training
set to tune the fingerprint and the testing set for validation.
In addition, we used 3,412 non-TLS TCP streams from a data set generated by
UNSW-NB15 [19]. This data set contains a variety of traffic types, but without
any TLS traffic so we can use it as another dimension of negative cases for testing
the fingerprints. Table above shows the traffic type of the majority by service
ports, only including standard ports under 1024. The table does not show the
whole spectrum of traffic types in this dataset, but rather provides a quick look.
More details on this data set are available in the original paper.
4.2 TLS
We test the signature generated as previously described over the training set
dhe00200 with thresholds of the confidence ρ above 99.2% for different measures.
4 A large portion of hosts scanned by the ZMap client did not respond or reject
connections for various reasons during TLS negotiation
Cipher ID Name
0x00015 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
0x00016 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0x00033 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0x00039 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0x00045 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
0x00067 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0x0006B TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00088 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
0x0009A TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
0x0009E TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0x0009F TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Table 3: TLS Ciphersuites of Choice: DHE-RSA-*
Port 80 25 22 143 21 111 179 139 110
# of Streams 582 189 168 125 96 44 18 5 5
The results shown in table 4 do not seem promising at all, of all the best results
from 1-4-8 and 1-2-4-8 only reach a recall rate, 62.84% and 64.22% with the
confidence of 99.85% respectively, but it does confirm that the strategy of using
multiple τ -measures significantly improves the recall rate. Also, it is interesting
to notice that the rate of multiple τ -measures drops significantly below 10% with
a confidence of 99.99%, which is reasonable because the threshold is too relaxed
(with a higher proportion of high entropy blocks) to be accurate.
@
@τ
ρ
99.20% 99.85% 99.97% 99.99%
1-bit 8.72% 36.70% 26.15% 26.14%
2-bit 15.13% 10.55% 23.39% 23.39%
4-bit 47.25% 25.68% 8.26% 11.93%
8-bit 42.40% 28.44% 3.21% 10.09%
1-2-8 31.19% 17.43% 7.80% 4.58%
1-4-8 45.41% 62.84% 38.99% 5.50%
1-2-4-8 39.44% 64.22% 39.44% 5.05%
Table 4: Recall rate of the original signature for TLS
By manually checking those failures, we found three major issues of our
original signature. One is the range of the server random bytes. It was a little
bit tighter than it appeared, which is previously set to be (+, 8, 54) as we used
the range estimated from client random bytes. It turns out to be inadequate as
the bytes after the server random bytes appear more random than those after
client random bytes, and therefore more likely produce a longer high-entropy
block. Following the same method as we did for client random bytes, we increase
the maximum length to 64. The second major issue is that we failed to consider
optional random bytes such as key identifier fields for both issuer and subject of
the certificate. The third one relies on the fact that two high-entropy areas might
be adjacent to each other without a sufficient gap and get merged to a larger
high-entropy area, e.g. the signature of certificate and the server key exchange
parameters. For the later two cases, we introduce optional blocks to the signature
making the signature scalable. In the regular expression, we can include optional
strings. For instance, our TLS signature has been extended to include optional
strings as below. This adjustment boosts the recall for most cases, as shown in
Table 5. For both cases of 1-4-8 and 1-2-4-8, the recall increases by around 20%.
‘...1{80, 260}(0{20, 1024}|{8, 160}(1{8, 70}|{8, 70}0{0, 300}1{8, 70})0{0, 500})...′.
@
@τ
ρ
99.20% 99.85% 99.97% 99.99%
1-bit 12.39% 6.88% 40.37% 40.37%
2-bit 21.10% 19.27% 38.53% 40.83%
4-bit 84.40% 73.39% 33.03% 13.30%
8-bit 67.43% 51.83% 11.01% 16.51%
1-2-8 41.28% 25.69% 18.34% 11.93%
1-4-8 55.05% 82.57% 67.43% 12.39%
1-2-4-8 49.54% 87.61% 67.43% 12.39%
Table 5: Recall using refined fingerprint
The noise threshold is used to remove false positives and make the fingerprint
more reliable. As the threshold increases, the detection accuracy of high-entropy
blocks will increase as we are eliminating those accidental “high-entropy” blocks.
At a certain point, this elimination may hurt the effectiveness as true high-
entropy blocks may be eliminated by such an excessively large threshold. We
experimented with different filter thresholds ξ using a 4-bit measure, as shown
in figure 6. Given its initial purpose, this parameter should be kept as small
as possible for effective filtering. Thus, ξ = 9 is chosen based on the empirical
results. As suggested by our test results, it appears to be a proper choice for
other measures, e.g. 1-4-8 measure.
Test Results After two improvement procedures, i.e. signature refinement and
parameter selection, the ultimate test over the testing sets, d00300, is shown in
the table below. The multiple τ -measure 1-4-8 now produces a good recall rate.
Finally, we fixed our noise threshold ξ = 9 and used the 1-4-8 measure. We
summarize our results over three datasets as follows. Overall, the TLS signature
has a precision of nearly 94.6% and its accuracy is around 94%, only including
negative cases from d00300 so as to have a equivalent size of positive cases.
On the other hand, negative cases from non-TLS, i.e. d00015, turn out to be
Fig. 6: Noise Threshold Selection over TLS traffic using a 4-bit measure
ξ=9 TP FN Recall
4-bit measure (ρ=99.20%) 1056 104 91.03%
1-4-8 measure (ρ=99.85%) 1079 81 93.02%
relatively trivial even though some of instances do contain high-entropy traffic,
for example, SSH on port 22.
4.3 Application on Botnet Detection: Nugache
The Nugache botnet, was one of the first peer-to-peer botnets to use strong
cryptography to protect its C&C channel, as the inter-peer communication was
encrypted using individually negotiated session keys derived using a hybrid
RSA/Rijndael scheme [6, 23, 26]. Specifically, Nugache uses a two-way RSA-like
key exchange protocol for every session with a minimum length of 512 bits for
the modulus. That is, one peer sends the length of the key to announce a peer
key exchange, followed by an actual key [6]; the other peer in turn replies with a
message of the same length encrypted with that public key. Compared to TLS,
signature extraction for Nugache is much easier because of the simplicity of its
key exchange. Since there is little control information in key exchange messages,
if consider the payload only, the signature can be simply defined as 1*, meaning
high-entropy blocks everywhere, which is also a strong detectable characteristic
distinct from other cryptographic protocols. Following the same consideration,
we choose ξ = 9, which yields a fair recall rate.
The initial fingerprint we generated for Nugache includes two high-entropy
areas, corresponding to the two-way key exchange. First, we test all τ -bit mea-
sures with a fixed noise threshold value ξ=9. It shows the 2-bit measure produces
good results (92.21% with ρ = 99.20%) but meanwhile our voting mechanism
clearly outperforms a single τ -bit measure given the same level of confidence.
We conservatively choose the 1-4-8 measure as our metric in a general.
In Table 8, we summarize our testing results of the Nugache signature over
three datasets as follows. It is encouraging that the Nugache signature generates
Dataset Total Positive Negative
d00200 : TLS w/ selected Cipher 1,160 1,079 81
d00300 : TLS w/ other Cipher 1,204 61 1,143
d00015 : non-TLS 3,412 0 3,412
Table 6: TLS signature over different datasets
@
@τ
ρ
99.20% 99.85% 99.97% 99.99%
2-bit 92.21% 67.90% 39.50% 17.28%
1-2-8 88.27% 90.12% 73.46% 56.17%
1-4-8 89.51% 92.21% 75.93% 56.17%
1-2-4-8 90.12% 95.06% 77.16% 56.17%
Table 7: Recall on Nugache (N=32)
no false positive and so has a precision of 100%. For obfuscation techniques, there
still a portion of the traffic, although small, will appear to have low entropy.
5 Limitations & Future Work
One may argue that high entropy does not necessarily imply encryption, com-
pressed data, or multimedia data. The critical point is the distribution of high-
entropy data blocks not solely the presence of high-entropy data. A study [32]
provides evidence against such “common sense,” where it was shown that mul-
timedia files could yield low entropy instead, although the authors also pointed
out that in some cases compressed files do have high entropy. Such cases require
a much closer look, which we left for future work. Furthermore, encodings, e.g.
base64 [16], can significantly reduce the entropy of a string. For this case, we
assume that a base64 detector as well as a decoder could be deployed to canon-
icalize the traffic data. It is also possible that one could easily inject arbitrary
bytes to disturb the original distribution of high entropy and low entropy. In this
case, we consider it to be a new protocol for which the traffic could be possibly
fingerprinted, e.g. using optional units as we did for TLS. If the signature genera-
tion process is automated, then this approach would still be efficient. However, if
more advanced obfuscation techniques [5,10] are applied, then our approach will
fail at identifying the obfuscated protocol. Nevertheless, our proposed techniques
may be still used to detect the obfuscation techniques themselves.
To avoid being fingerprinted, malware could adopt plain TLS instead of cus-
tomizing the protocol, running the risk of SSL inspection. It may explain why
there only 10% of malware samples indeed utilize TLS. Nevertheless, the work [1]
also found that malware or botnets utilize TLS in a very customized way, i.e.
advertising significantly much fewer cipher suites than enterprise TLS clients. A
shorter list of cipher suites will reduce the control information (i.e. low-entropy
blocks) and therefore may end with different fingerprints than enterprise-grade
Dataset Desc Total Positive Negative
- Nugache 175 162 13
d00200, d00300 TLS 2,364 0 2,364
d00015 non-TLS 3,412 0 3,412
Table 8: Nugache fingerprint over different datasets
TLS clients. Investigating how effective our approach would be in such a sce-
nario is left for future work. Under certain circumstances, it is possible that our
approach may not be sufficient to rule out all possible false positives and we
would recommend to coordinate with other tools for reducing false positives.
Last but not least, we are interested in looking at more diverse data, such as
compressed data, SSH, and other malware traffic.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel voting-based method for accurately detecting
high-entropy blocks, e.g. key material, in a network traffic stream, and a method
based on regular expressions for generating a scalable fingerprint based on iden-
tified high-entropy blocks. Our approach can effectively put malware authors on
the defense, as a longer key used for a more securely encrypted connection would
make it more easily characterized and therefore more detectable. However, if a
shorter key is used for making the connection less vulnerable to detection, then
they would only achieve a less secure connection.
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